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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 13-4427 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 MARVIN DAVIS, a/k/a TR, 
                          Appellant  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00188-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 10, 2015) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Marvin Davis appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress 
inculpatory statements he made to FBI agents. We will affirm. 
I 
 In January 2012, the FBI was investigating a number of robberies that had 
occurred in Pennsylvania and Delaware. The FBI believed that Davis had information 
about the robberies, so the agents sought to interview him to determine if he could be a 
witness in their federal case. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania issued a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 
 Two days before Davis’s scheduled grand jury appearance, two FBI agents 
brought him to a proffer room for an interview. Davis’s ankle cuffs were shackled to the 
floor of the proffer room. Before conducting the interview, one agent explained to Davis 
why he was in federal custody and advised him of his Miranda rights. The agent also 
gave Davis an FBI Advice of Rights form, which Davis read to himself and then the agent 
read aloud to him. Davis indicated that he understood his rights and signed the form 
waiving them. Davis then admitted that he had committed several robberies. At the end of 
the interview, the agents recommended that he obtain an attorney before testifying to the 
grand jury. Davis did not request an attorney at any point during the interview. 
 In January 2013, Davis was indicted on various robbery and firearm charges. Prior 
to trial, he moved to suppress his inculpatory statements on the grounds that the FBI 
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agents violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. The District Court denied his suppression motion, concluding that Davis 
waived his rights before making the inculpatory statements. A jury found Davis guilty on 
all counts, and the District Court sentenced him to 661 months’ imprisonment, of which 
660 months were mandated by statute. Davis timely appealed.1 
II 
 Davis argues that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106, we should vacate the judgment of 
the District Court and remand with instructions to reconsider its suppression ruling in 
light of United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976). In DiGilio, we held that 
“grand jury subpoenas [cannot be used] as a ploy for the facilitation of office 
interrogation.” Id. at 985. Davis admits that he forfeited his DiGilio argument by failing 
to raise it before the District Court but contends that we nevertheless retain authority to 
remand in light of § 2106, which states: 
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, 
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a 
court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and 
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require 
such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances. 
The Government responds that we can consider the forfeited argument only if Davis 
                                                 
 1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We have plenary authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 
to make such disposition of the case as may be just under the circumstances.” Haynes v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 85, 101 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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provides good cause under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c)(3). 
 Because Davis cannot show that remand is just under the circumstances, we will 
assume without deciding that (1) we have authority to remand for reconsideration in light 
of the forfeited argument and (2) the § 2106 standard rather than Rule 12 governs here. 
“The authority granted by § 2106 is discretionary[.]” United States v. Murray, 144 F.3d 
270, 274 (3d Cir. 1998). Davis offers three reasons why exercising our discretion to 
remand would be just under the circumstances. 
 First, he argues that the actions of the FBI agents were at odds with DiGilio and, 
because DiGilio was cited with approval in commentary to the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, the issue is of national importance. But Davis cites no authority 
supporting the notion that a factor in our § 2106 analysis is whether an issue is of national 
importance. A plain reading of § 2106—especially the language about whether something 
is just under the circumstances—indicates that our inquiry should focus on particular, 
contextual factors specific to the party. Accordingly, Davis has not persuaded us that the 
importance of an issue in the criminal justice system at large is relevant. 
 Second, Davis initially argued that the FBI’s conduct here was a standard practice, 
as indicated by one FBI agent using the “specialized term” of a “breakdown” to refer to 
the interview process. Davis Br. 25 (quoting App. 502–03). Apparently, though, the agent 
actually said “bring-down”—a colloquial term in Philadelphia for bringing an inmate 
down to the courthouse from his confinement—and the word “breakdown” was just an 
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error in transcribing the agent’s testimony. Gov’t. Br. 23 (citing S. App. 102–03). Davis 
“agrees that this revision is accurate,” Reply Br. 4, and thus has apparently abandoned his 
second argument. 
 Third, Davis argues that the severity of his sentence militates in favor of resolving 
the suppression claim on the merits. While Davis’s sentence is quite severe, he has 
already filed a suppression motion that was resolved on the merits. Justice is not served 
by giving defendants new hearings whenever they commit serious crimes that carry 
serious penalties. Davis therefore offers no persuasive reason for us to remand. 
 Nor does our own independent inquiry elicit any reason to disturb the District 
Court’s judgment. There is, for example, no change “either in fact or in law” that has 
occurred since Davis’s initial suppression motion. United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 
235 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we will affirm. 
